Jaime Daremblum

Several decades after its founding as the Western Hemisphere’s premier democratic forum, the Organization of American States (OAS) is in danger of becoming irrelevant. As a former Latin America diplomat, I say this with great regret. The OAS should be a powerful vehicle for defending democracy and promoting regional cooperation. Yet, it has been weakened and corrupted by poor leadership and structural deficiencies.

The poor leadership has come from José Miguel Insulza, a Chilean socialist who has served as secretary general of the OAS since 2005. Insulza has politicized the institution and pursued ideological causes that have little (if any) connection to Latin America’s most pressing challenges. Earlier this year, for example, Insulza spearheaded an aggressive movement to end Cuba’s 47-year-old suspension from the OAS. I have never seen the organization so energized over a single issue. In early June, Insulza and his allies got their way, as the ban on Cuban membership was lifted (though the island was not formally readmitted).

According to its charter, one of the “essential purposes” of the OAS is “to promote and consolidate representative democracy.” Yet at a time when democracy is being rolled back in several of its member countries, the OAS has been preoccupied with embracing a Communist dictatorship–a dictatorship that says it has no interest in joining the democratic club.

Under Insulza, the OAS’s priorities have been skewed by ideological biases. Across Latin America, politicians have been loudly critical of the U.S. embargo against Cuba; but they have been remarkably silent about the sustained attacks on democracy in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador. Indeed, while the Cuba embargo has become a cause célèbre for the Latin American left, the anti-democratic policies of Hugo Chávez and his populist cronies have been greeted with a collective shrug.

If the OAS is unwilling to stand up for democracy in its member countries, then it is no longer a serious organization. What is happening today in Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Ecuador represents a sharp reversal of hard-fought democratic gains. Yet too many OAS members seem blinded by ideology. Latin American officials waged a forceful campaign to lift the OAS ban on Cuba. They have hardly lifted a finger to support besieged democrats in Caracas and Managua. Sadly, the institution’s stated commitment to democracy has become a bad joke–and Insulza has done nothing to salvage it.

Besides being overly ideological, Insulza has also been ineffective. He failed to defuse the Honduran political crisis before it exploded with Manuel Zelaya’s removal from office on June 28. Even a casual observer of Honduran affairs could have seen that real trouble was brewing, and that President Zelaya’s irresponsible behavior was leading to a showdown. After Zelaya’s exile, Insulza was utterly intransigent and failed to work constructively with the interim Honduran government to resolve the crisis. He ignored Zelaya’s crimes against the Honduran constitution and insisted that the exiled Chávez acolyte immediately be restored as president. When Honduras refused to comply, it was suspended from the OAS.
As of this writing, the negotiations to solve the political crisis in Honduras remain deadlocked. In all likelihood, if the dispute is eventually settled, most of the credit will belong to the Honduran people, a heroic nation willing to make compromises in hopes of achieving a democratic and just resolution. In any event, the elections next November should provide a legitimate end to the internal conflict. Meanwhile, the OAS has been rigid and unyielding, not to mention unrealistic in its demands.

While Insulza has been a disastrous OAS chief, the institution suffers from structural deficiencies that he did not create. Each of the 34 member countries (there are currently 33 active members, given the suspension of Honduras) has equal voting weight. In other words, regional giants and economic powerhouses such as Brazil and Mexico wield the same voting power as tiny island-nations. The smaller, poorer countries often neglect broader hemispheric concerns and instead pursue their own interests, which typically involve oil and economic aid.

The OAS makes decisions by “consensus,” meaning that a tyranny of the minority can paralyze its operations. A single country–no matter how small its population or absurd its arguments–can prevent the institution from executing an important decision. These days, all decisions are effectively subject to the approval of Hugo Chávez, who has used economic assistance or ideological outreach to gain major influence over the votes of at least 20 member countries, including Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Argentina, Paraguay, and most Caribbean nations. In addition to these problems, the OAS is plagued by a cumbersome and unaccountable bureaucracy that often stifles significant action.

It is a shame that such an important organization has sacrificed its credibility and forfeited much of its moral authority. Now more than ever, the hemisphere needs a strong multilateral institution dedicated to upholding democratic values. The growing irrelevance of the OAS is good news for Latin America’s aspiring autocrats. It is bad news for everyone else.

Ambassador Jaime Daremblum is a senior fellow with Hudson Institute and directs the Center for Latin American Studies.

Publicado en Hudson Institute

Jaime Daremblum

U.S.-Russia diplomacy is currently dominated by issues such as Iran, missile defense, and the post-Soviet republics. But the Obama administration must not ignore Moscow’s role in facilitating the dangerous Venezuelan arms buildup and the nuclear ambitions of Hugo Chávez.

On September 13, Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez announced triumphantly that Russia had agreed to extend his government a $2.2 billion credit line for the purchase of sophisticated military hardware, including tanks, missiles, and air-defense systems. Chávez insisted that these arms purchases “are necessary for our national defense.” But U.S. officials think otherwise–and with good reason. “What they are looking to purchase and what they are purchasing outpaces all other countries in South America,” State Department spokesmen Ian Kelly said of the Venezuelans on September 14. “We’re concerned about an arms race in the region.” Secretary of State Hillary Clinton echoed these comments a day later.

Venezuela’s arms buildup is indeed threatening to fuel a regional arms race–and no foreign country has done more to make that arms buildup possible than Russia. In recent years, Caracas and Moscow have signed arms deals worth more than $5 billion. Russian strategic analyst Ruslan Pukhov has predicted that over the next decade, Venezuela may purchase another $5 billion worth of Russian arms. Meanwhile, in June 2008, the two countries agreed to create a bi-national bank with $4 billion worth of starting capital. They have also signed several energy pacts, including a nuclear-cooperation accord. Venezuelan officials recently confirmed that their country is receiving assistance from both Russia and Iran as it seeks to locate uranium deposits. (The South American nation is believed to have massive untapped uranium reserves.)

In December 2008, Venezuelan and Russian warships–including a Russian nuclear cruiser–held joint military exercises in the Caribbean. The Guardian noted that these exercises represented “Moscow’s first show of naval force in the region since the Cold War.” Speaking of the Cold War, the Russian warships that participated in the December 2008 naval maneuvers paid visit to Cuba that same month. Russian president Dmitry Medvedev has been keen to strengthen military ties with the Raúl Castro regime. Raúl, for his part, has always been an admirer of the Russian armed forces.

Given the authoritarian nature of the Medvedev-Putin government and its aggressive push to reestablish Russia as a world power, we should be wary of the Kremlin’s renewed interest in Latin America and its military links with Venezuela and Cuba. In mid-September, Russia’s top military official, General Nikolai Makarov, traveled to the Communist island and met with his Cuban counterpart, General lvaro López Miera. Other senior Russian officials who have visited Cuba this year include Igor Sechin, a deputy prime minister, and Nikolai Patrushev, chief of the Russian Security Council. According to Russia’s RIA Novosti news agency, Russian military sources have suggested that Moscow may decide to “resume operations” at its former electronic-espionage facility in Lourdes (a town near Havana), a Cold War-era installation that was closed in 2001, and also “use airbases in Cuba for refueling of strategic aircraft.”

Of course, Cuba is no longer the main destabilizing force in Latin America; Venezuela has assumed that role. Under Chávez, the “Bolivarian Republic” has undermined Latin democracies, supported terrorist groups, and embraced terror-sponsoring regimes such as Iran and Syria. This is why the Russia-Venezuela relationship is so worrisome. Thanks to his deals with Moscow, Chávez has been stockpiling modern fighter jets, helicopters, tanks, missiles, anti-aircraft systems, and tens of thousands of Kalashnikov submachine guns. There is a very real possibility that some of these weapons will wind up in the hands of terrorists. It is now undeniable that the Chávez government has provided material support to the FARC terrorists in Colombia. This past July, Colombian military forces raided a FARC camp and found Venezuelan anti-tank rocket launchers. There is also persuasive evidence that Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed terrorist organization, has established a presence in Venezuela. Last year, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Chávez regime of “employing and providing safe harbor to Hezbollah facilitators and fundraisers.”

Chávez is a leftist, but also a militarist–a self styled caudillo similar to prior Latin American despots. He has repeatedly threatened the conservative, pro-U.S. government in Bogotá, and has bitterly denounced Washington’s plans to expand U.S. military activities in Colombia. His stockpiling of advanced weaponry poses a very real threat to regional stability, and it would not be happening without Moscow’s assistance. Thanks to Russian arms sales, Chávez is now in a stronger position to consolidate his dictatorship at home and provide military support to anti-democratic, pro-Chávez governments and terrorist groups elsewhere in Latin America.

Ambassador Jaime Daremblum is a senior fellow with Hudson Institute and directs the Center for Latin American Studies.